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Abstract
Company stock option plans have diverse “sunset” policies for modifying terms of options held
by managers who exit the firm.  In our S&P 500 sample, these forfeiture, vesting, and expiration
provisions are less generous in companies characterized by fast growth, dependence on skilled
human capital, and high strategic interaction with competitors.  While these results apply for
workers who retire at the end of their careers, almost no variation exists in the treatment of
workers who resign with the possibility of working elsewhere.  We show that these features of
firms’ option plans directly impact management turnover.  For CEOs over age 60, companies’
sunset rules imply large discounts to option award values and estimates of total compensation.
The authors appreciate helpful comments from Manuel Ammann, Patrick Bolton, Jennifer
Carpenter, Don Chance, Stephen Choi, John Core, Joan Heminway, Tracie Woidtke, and seminar
participants at Chinese University Hong Kong, Fordham University, Georgetown University,
Mannheim University, University of St. Gallen, University of Tennessee, and the Gerzensee
European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets.
1 For example, the stopping state model introduced by Carpenter (1998) requires that when leaving the firm,
“the executive exercises the option if it is in the money and vested, or else forfeits the option.”  A survey of option
pricing models by Ammann and Seiz (2004) includes a similar characterization, common to a wide range of models, that
“if the employee leaves after the vesting period, the option is forfeited if it is out of the money and exercised
(immediately) if it is in the money.”  A theory paper by Bulow and Shoven (2005) opens with the assertion that “Most
employee options must be exercised within 90 days of the termination of employment.”  The authors give no empirical
support for this claim, which they use to motivate a proposal to account for all vested stock options as 90-day options,
extended every quarter.  All of these models will under-state the value of options to employees, as well as their cost to
issuing companies, if workers are allowed to retain significant option value when exiting a company.
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I Introduction
This study investigates how companies treat executive stock options when managers
leave their positions due to retirement, resignation, or death.  The substantial literature analyzing
executive options generally assumes that they terminate immediately or within a short period
after managers exit the firm.1  In reality, companies have diverse policies, which we call “sunset”
regulations, for how to modify the options of managers who leave the firm.
Sunset rules can lead to major changes in option awards’ vesting schedules and
expiration dates when managers leave the company.  Firms may set their sunset rules either
tightly or leniently.  Tight sunset rules would imply that a firm is very concerned with worker
retention, since option holders exiting the firm would suffer large value losses.  Lenient sunset
2rules might be used for an entirely different motive, to lengthen the investment horizons of
managers by allowing them to continue holding their stock options long after they leave the
company.  Either the retention motive or the horizon motive might be important in companies
with significant growth options or long-term investment opportunities.
Our main empirical result is a demonstration that for most firms, the retention motive
dominates the horizon motive, as stronger sunset rules related to management retirement are
systematically associated with variables related to growth opportunities.  We also find that when
retirement sunset rules are strong, firms exhibit lower frequencies of management turnover,
again consistent with these rules being used for retention.  However, we find that sunset rules
related to resignations, rather than retirements, are generally quite harsh and exhibit little cross-
sectional variation related to the characteristics of different firms.
Strong sunset rules also imply material reductions to the apparent award date values of
options given to executives who are near retirement age.  Using our dataset, we estimate that the
sample mean value of new option awards should be reduced by more than half, and total CEO
compensation should be reduced by as much as 25%, for CEOs aged 65 and older, if one
assumes that these CEOs expect to retire in one year.  We also derive large discounts to
estimated means of option compensation and total compensation for CEOs at all ages above 60,
based upon an assumption that these CEOs expect to retire at age 65.
Although we lack precise data about how frequently sunset rules impact the value of
equity compensation, we can infer some basic estimates by studying option holdings and
executive turnover in the population of top managers covered by the ExecuComp database for
our sample of S&P 500 companies.  Within this group, the annual turnover frequency is
2 Turnover rates for lower-level employees are probably higher than these estimates for top managers, implying
even greater importance for firms’ sunset rules.  Although employee turnover data does not exist for individual
companies, we tabulate industry level turnover data compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics between 2001 and
2006 in its monthly Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) survey.  If the firms in our sample exhibited
employee turnover at the mean levels of their respective industries in the JOLTS survey, the turnover rate for ordinary
workers in these companies would be about 34.0% per year.
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approximately 12.8%, implying that the half-life of a typical manager’s stay with each firm is
just over five years and the expected interval between changing jobs is about 7.6 years.2  At the
end of their last years listed on ExecuComp, on average managers hold approximately 5.4 years
worth of unexercised option awards.  These data are consistent with a clear majority of option
exercises taking place after managers leave their companies, implying that firms’ sunset rules for
vesting, forfeiture, and truncation eventually become operative for most option awards.
Our research adds to a relatively thin literature of four papers that have studied inter-firm
differences in the design and implementation of executive stock option plans.  These studies
include Kole (1997), who examines companies’ different vesting rules for options; Pasternack
and Rosenberg (2003), who study exercise prices and dividend protection in the option plans of
Finnish firms; Chen (2004), who studies repricing restrictions in U.S. firms’ option plans; and
Sautner and Weber (2006), who examine a variety of aspects of European companies’ option
plans.  The Sautner and Weber study is the most comprehensive to date, but the variables it
examines, including accounting choices, completeness of disclosure, and performance targets for
options to become exercisable, have little relevance for most U.S. firms since accounting and
disclosure practices are mandatory, and performance targets for options to become exercisable
remain relatively rare.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows.  Section II provides a
description of the data and an overview of different option sunset rules.  Section III studies
4cross-sectional differences in sunset rules among companies.  Section IV provides analysis
indicating that sunset rules have significant associations with rates of executive turnover. 
Section V contains conclusions.
II Data description
A.  Data collection
Our dataset is drawn form the most recent shareholder-approved equity compensation
plans in effect for companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index in the Fall of 2005.  SEC
disclosure rules require the full text of each plan to be filed as an attachment to a Form 10-K, 10-
Q, 14-A (proxy statement), or 8-K during the fiscal quarter in which the plan goes into effect.  In
each subsequent year, a company’s 10-K filing includes an Exhibit Index cross-referencing the
documents where one can obtain the full text of all compensation plans then in effect.  These
plans usually contain information about the vesting schedules, forfeiture rules, and other
parameters of stock option awards, but some plans use vague or general language and leave the
specific terms to the discretion of a board of directors subcommittee (usually its compensation or
stock option committee).  In such cases, we frequently find this information in a term sheet
written by the board subcommittee and also filed with the SEC.
Equity compensation plans in many firms also provide for restricted stock, performance
shares, or other derivative forms of equity pay.  We limit our analysis to stock options, because
their role in executive compensation is far larger than these other instruments.  Our reading of
many firms’ plans indicates that restricted stock, when authorized, very often has sunset rules for
vesting and forfeiture exactly matching those for stock options, so we believe our conclusions
3 A small number of companies permit minor increases in option life under certain conditions; for example, in
cases of death some firms leave intact the expiration date of the decedent’s options but specify that the estate will have no
less than 6 months to exercise should the options’ expiration be imminent.  Because these adjustments are rare, generally
small, and incompatible with most of our data definitions, we do not incorporate them into our analysis.
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about option compensation apply in a straightforward way to all types of equity pay.
Table 1 indicates that we locate the option plans and/or term sheets for 389 of the 500
companies in the S&P 500 index, and these firms comprise the sample for analysis presented
below.  Of the 111 S&P 500 companies not in our sample, the large majority lack an SEC filing
describing their sunset rules with adequate specificity.  A minority of missing firms, 21
companies, are omitted because they either have no option plan in effect or have recently
announced an intention to stop awarding options as compensation.
Our data collection focuses on two aspects of stock options: whether the expiration date
changes when an executive leaves the firm, and whether provisions for vesting or exercisability
change.
B. Changes to option life
Table 2 presents basic summary statistics about option life before and after an employee
leaves the firm.  In the top half of the table, data indicate that ten-year options are awarded by an
overwhelming majority of companies, in line with a longstanding practice that can be traced to
personal income tax preferences that require options to expire in ten years or less.  The lower
half of Table 2 shows how much option life is retained by managers who leave their companies,
and the full distributions of these data are plotted in Figure I.  We report the maximum time
permitted for executives to exercise their options; in cases in which the option already had less
life remaining than the maximum permitted under the plan, the shorter time will apply.3  We
4 These three types of departures are mentioned in nearly every company’s plan.  A significant minority of 
firms have additional rules for departures that occur for such reasons as layoffs (involuntary terminations) or permanent
disability.  When present, we find that the sunset rules for layoffs are often close to identical to the rules for resignations,
and the rules for disability are very similar to those for cases of death.
5 One firm, Synovus Financial, goes to great length to distinguish between suicides and other causes of death in
its 2002 Long Term Incentive Plan, which mentions suicide no less than eight times.  Similar to other companies,
Synovus in cases of death provides for accelerated vesting of equity compensation and a long period for the optionee’s
estate to exercise, but only if the deceased manager did not take his own life.  The company did not respond to our
inquiry asking about the reasons for this safeguard against the moral hazard problem of executives killing themselves in
order to achieve more rapid vesting of their options.
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tabulate data for three different types of departures: resignations, retirements, and deaths.4 
Resignations are mid-career departures of executives who presumably will take other jobs,
perhaps with competitor firms.  Retirements are distinguished from resignations in most firms by
a formula tied to age and years of service, though more than half of our sample companies do not
make clear disclosures of these guidelines.  In a minority of companies, no distinction is drawn
between resignation and retirement, and the same sunset provisions for equity pay apply in either
case.  Deaths in office are analyzed as a benchmark for the other two categories of departure;
deaths present a useful baseline because of the complete absence of any moral hazard issue
related to the executive’s departure from the firm, as well as the lack of concern that the
executive may work elsewhere.5
Data in Table 2 and Figure I show that mid-career resignations generally lead to
elimination of the large majority of option life, as more than 85% of companies give managers
three months or less to exercise their options after a resignation (just over half of company
resignation policies appear to follow the 90-day rule that is the focus of the model in Bulow and
Shoven (2005), though the fraction is far less for retirements and deaths).  Retirements are
treated much differently.  The mean and median option life retained when executives retire is 4.4
and 3.0 years, respectively, and a significant fraction of companies permit executives to hold
6 Earlier vesting would increase the options’ subjective value to an employee.  However, it could also reduce the
expected cost to shareholders by triggering value-destroying earlier exercise.
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their options for their full term in cases of retirement.  For deaths in office, the deceased
executive’s heirs or estate inherit the right to exercise the option, and the mean and median
periods permitted for exercise are 3.2 and 1.0 years, respectively.  Figure I shows that, in terms
of firms’ leniency toward option holders, death represents an intermediate state between
resignation, which generally leads to large reductions in option values, and retirement, in which
optionees are often treated generously.
C. Changes in vesting schedules
Along with the possible truncation of option maturity, equity compensation plans also
include regulations for how to treat options that have not yet vested at the time that an executive
leaves the firm.  In this case, sunset rules could lead either to a reduction of option value, which
would occur if the unvested options are forfeited in whole or in part, or possibly an increase in
value, if the executive’s departure triggers more rapid vesting of options than would be the case
if he stayed employed.6  Detail about these regulations appears in Table 3.
The table begins with information about the overall vesting schedules for firms in the
sample.  Of the 389 firms that we study, we were unable to determine vesting rules for 30,
although we do know their sunset rules for treatment of unvested options (whatever the vesting
schedule) when an optionee leaves.  The remaining 359 firms for which we have complete
information feature 89 distinct vesting schedules; the most popular schedules call for annual
7 Some firms make option awards with several different vesting schedules, even though the awards might occur
in the same year.  In such cases we use the most common schedule, which can usually be ascertained easily from
information in the annual proxy statement.  A small minority of firms attach performance conditions to the vesting of
option awards, particularly for managers at the very top of the hierarchy such as the CEO.  We ignore these contingent
vesting schedules for purposes of this study and focus instead on vesting schedules for generic options.
8 Options that continue on their original vesting schedules will eventually become exercisable with the passage
of time, unless the firm also has truncation rules (see above) that shorten the option life so that the new expiration date
falls before the completion of vesting.
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vesting of awards in three or four tranches at each anniversary of the award date.7  To analyze
the wide range of schedules, we summarize vesting information using a handful of statistics,
including the weighted average time for a company’s entire award to vest, the median time to
vest (the time after which half of more of the options are exerciseable), and the time for 100% of
an award to vest.  Panel A at the top of Table 3 presents information about these statistics.  The
data indicate that the weighted average time for an award to vest is about two and a half years,
and the median vesting time is about two years.
In the center of Table 3, Panel B shows information about the treatment of unvested
options for executive departures in the three categories of resignation, retirement, and death. 
The treatments range from immediate accelerated vesting, the most favorable case, which is
shown in the top row, and forfeiture of all unvested options, the most punitive case, which is
shown in the bottom row.  Clear disparities exist in the treatment of options across the three
states.  Nearly all companies – 96% of the sample – cancel unvested options in cases of
resignation, but these forfeiture frequencies are much smaller – 44% and 35% – in cases of
retirement and death, respectively.  About 60% of firms allow for immediate or continuing
vesting of options in cases of death, and about 50% of firms do so for retirees.8  As shown in the
table, a small minority of firms have regulations that call for partial forfeiture of unvested
options in any or all of the three types of separations, with the fraction of options forfeited
9calculated according to a fixed rule or a pro rata schedule with respect to the passage of time
since the award date.
D. Substitute and complement relation of sunset rules
Data from Tables 2 and 3 indicate that optionees can lose substantial value when leaving
their firms either because of the truncation of option life or the forfeiture of unvested options. 
An obvious question is whether these two types of adjustments operate as substitutes,
complements, or orthogonally, and Panel C of Table 3 presents data showing an umambiguous
complementary relationship.  For all three types of executive departures, the panel compares the
average option life retained by optionees who receive the most lenient treatment of unvested
options – immediate, accelerated vesting – to those who receive the harshest treatment –
complete forfeiture.  The average life retained is far higher in firms that provide for accelerated
vesting.  The data therefore show that when firms wish to recoup option value from executives
who leave the company, they tend to do so in two ways at once, both shortening the options’
lives and canceling options that have not yet vested, so that sunset rules operate strongly as
complements with respect to one another.
In contrast, we find a substitute relation between sunset rules and the presence of defined
benefit pension plans for CEOs.  These pension plans act as management retention devices and
are generally structured to give managers incentives to stay with their firms until a “normal
retirement age,” which is often age 65 (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007).  We use ExecuComp
data to identify companies in our sample that also maintain defined benefit CEO pensions; our
sample exhibits an almost even 50-50 split between companies that have CEO pension plans and
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those that do not.  We find a clear pattern more lenient sunset rules, which reduce the costs of
early exit for CEOs, in firms with CEO pensions, which increase the costs of early exit: for
example, the average months of option life retained in retirement are 69 in firms with pension
plans vs. 37 in other firms (t-statistic 7.43), and the fraction of firms in which unvested options
are forfeited at retirement is 0.32 in firms with pension pans vs. 0.56 in other firms (t-statistic
4.87).
We also examine the related question of whether the value of CEO option awards are
adjusted to take account of vesting, forfeiture, and related provisions.  Using data for our sample
companies in 2004, we model their CEOs’ annual stock option award values as a function of
standard compensation variables, including firm size, industry, company performance, the
CEO’s percent ownership, and the CEO’s age, among others.  As dependent variables we use the
Black-Scholes value of each CEO’s award, the log of 1 plus this value, and the ratio of stock
option award value to total compensation.  We augment these regressions with various measures
of the strength of each firm’s sunset rules, including the weighted average time for options to
vest, a dummy variable for whether unvested options are forfeited upon retirement, the number
of months of option life retained by executives who retire, and the fraction of option award value
lost when an executive receives an award and retires on year later.  Despite trying various
combinations of regressor variables, we find almost no evidence of statistical significance for
any of the sunset rules upon cross-sectional values of awards to individual CEOs.  Thus, neither
the value of a CEO’s option award nor the fraction of his total compensation in the form of
options appear to be related to sunset provisions.
9 The clearest demonstration of this appears in Table 1 of Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), the first published
study of CEO turnover.  That table shows that the unconditional turnover frequency for CEOs spikes upward at ages 63,
64, and 65, and that less than 10% of CEOs in office at any given time are over 65.  More recent studies feature similar
statistics; for example, Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004) show that the mean age for departing CEOs is 61.6 years,
and the median is 63, with a standard deviation of 5.85 years.  Hayes and Schaefer (1999) report mean ages of 61 for
CEOs who die in office and 51 for CEOs who resign to take the top job at other firms.
10 Research into CEO separation agreements indicates that, although boards of directors have the flexibility to
waive sunset rules, this happens infrequently.  Yermack (2006) presents data indicating that standard sunset rules for
equity compensation are altered for only 8% of CEOs retiring voluntarily and 16% of CEOs who are dismissed, and some
of these alterations relate only to restricted stock and not options.  An interesting qualification to this result is that many
exiting CEOs remain as participants in their firms’ equity compensation plans and keep their options alive by continuing
as members of their boards of directors after leaving the CEO post.  However, post-CEO board service is relatively rare
for dismissed CEOs and is generally of short tenure even in cases of friendly CEO succession.
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E. Sunset rules and the apparent award date value of executive options
Studies of executive turnover suggest that a large majority of managers should expect to
leave their companies at or before age 65.9  This timetable should affect the apparent value of
new stock option awards to recipients with ages in the early to mid 60s.  Members of this cohort
would ordinarily not expect to remain employed for the entire option term, meaning that their
firms’ sunset rules would very likely lead to modifications in their options before expiration.  We
assess the impact of sunset rules upon ex ante option valuations using data about the stock option
awards received by CEOs of our sample firms in 2004.  We assume that each CEO will retire at
age 65 or, if already past 65, then one year after the award.  We recognize that these retirement
assumptions are stylized and do not reflect the possibility of retirement dates depending
endogenously upon sunset rules, so our results should be interpreted as suggestive.10  
For each actual CEO option award award, we ascertain how much, if any, would not have
vested by the expected retirement date of age 65, and we apply the company’s sunset rules for
forfeiture and/or accelerated or pro-rata vesting, as appropriate.  We also assume that the
options’ life is expected to change at each CEO’s retirement, again using the company’s sunset
rules, and we use these rules to calculate shortened expiration dates for each CEO’s options
11 For option valuation we use the Black-Scholes approach for ease of calculation.  Many other valuation
techniques have been applied to executive options, including binomial, stopping state, lattice, and utility-based models. 
Most of our analysis focuses upon the relative loss in option value caused by different sunset regulations, and we believe
that within reasonable tolerances, these relative differentials should generally be invariant to the choice of valuation
model.  See Ammann and Seiz (2004).
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whenever such an adjustment is relevant.
Table 4 presents the results of this analysis for three subsamples of CEOs: those aged 61-
62, 63-64, and 65 or above.  The table shows apparent option award values for these subsamples
before and after application of each firm’s sunset rules.11  The impact of the sunset rules is
significant: the values of options awarded to CEOs aged 61-62 should be reduced by a mean of
13%, while the mean reductions for CEOs in the two older age groups are 44% and 53%,
respectively.  Because option awards comprise roughly half of total CEO compensation for our
sample firms, the impact of these reductions is extremely important.
Two qualifications to this analysis are important.  First, many approaches to valuing
executive options use a reduced expected option life to reflect the possibility of early exercise.  If
these reductions were imposed across-the-board, the dollar-value reductions calculated above
would diminish.  Second, the differences in option value that we find do not carry over as
dramatically to calculations of incentives, as measured by the deltas of options or their change in
value with respect to the underlying stock price.
III Cross-sectional determinants of sunset rules
A. Hypotheses
Having described the distribution of sunset rules across companies, we now analyze how
the strength of these rules varies cross-sectionally.  Our null hypothesis is that sunset rules occur
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randomly with no systematic connection to other firm characteristics.  We explore two
alternative hypotheses, related to well-known theories about how equity compensation is used to
influence the long-term relationships between top executives and their firms.  These theories
have evolved around two main concerns: lengthening executives’ investment horizons, and
discouraging valuable executives from leaving the company.
In the academic literature, much of the early theoretical treatment of executive options
studied whether they could influence managers to choose investment projects with long-horizon
payoffs.  Dechow and Sloan (1991) is probably the examplar of this line of research, which
focused upon using equity compensation to counter incentives for managers to cut investment
spending in order to increase accounting profits near the end of their careers.  Some empirical
evidence for the horizon problem appears in Murphy and Zimmerman’s (1993) study of
company financial performance surrounding CEO turnover events.
If the horizon problem represents an important factor in management compensation, its
influence should be most apparent in companies characterized by valuable long-term investment
opportunities, loosely described as growth firms.  These companies tend to require highly skilled
managers who have expertise in selecting and implementing investments from the menu of a
firm’s potential projects (Smith and Watts, 1992).  Awarding these managers equity pay,
especially in the late stages of their careers, would give them a financial stake in the payoffs of
these projects even beyond the dates at which they separated from their firms.  We therefore test
the alternative hypothesis that sunset rules are set leniently in growth firms in which human
capital represents an especially important input to the value creation process.
A separate hypothesis, yielding an opposite set of predictions, arises from the widely
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recognized use of stock option compensation as an employee retention device.  Following this
theory, sunset rules should be set tightly rather than leniently in firms for which human capital is
especially important, in order to prevent managers either from retiring too early or from
resigning to work for a competitor.  The retention theory, sometimes known as “golden
handcuffs,” is therefore more concerned with securing the services of good managers so that they
can choose the next generation of a firm’s investments, as opposed to influencing the payoff
horizon of the investments they might select.  The retention aspect of equity pay has been
highlighted by many authors, beginning at least with Smith and Watts (1992) and probably
earlier.  Core and Guay (2001) elaborate on how this theory applies to option programs broadly
targeting all of a firm’s employees.
B. Variable definitions
We use regression analysis of the sunset rules in our sample of S&P 500 companies to
test the competing hypotheses of whether growth companies with valuable human capital set
their sunset rules loosely, due to investment horizon concerns, or tightly, for retention reasons. 
These two alternative hypotheses are tested against a null hypothesis that sunset rules are
established without attention to firm characteristics.  We estimate regressions that follow the
general form:
Tightness of sunset rulesi ' α % β) (Growth opportunities)i %γ) (Controls)i % εi
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics about the key variables used in our regressions.  The first
four lines of the table reproduce data introduced earlier to describe options’ vesting schedules,
the time permitted for exercise after retirement or resignation, and forfeiture of unvested options
15
at retirement.  The next two lines present two variables that we calculate by transforming our
basic data about sunset rules into economic measures of their value consequences for option
holders.
We construct a measure of the percent of option award value lost when a hypothetical
employee at each sample firm receives a new option award and then retires one year later.  So
that our variable will show clearly the effects of forfeiture and truncation rules, we use fixed
assumptions for all companies for the exercise price ($25.00), stock price ($25.00), volatility
(0.30), dividend rate (0.015), and risk-free rate (0.045), and we calculate a benchmark Black-
Scholes option value for each firm under these assumptions.  We then determine how this
benchmark value would change if the executive retired one year after the award, with the firm’s
rules about vesting, forfeiture, and maturity truncation becoming operational at that time.  Table
5 shows that the median retirement adjustment to options reduces their award value by 65.7%,
and the inter-quartile range of this variable is quite large, from 22.3% at the top of the first
quartile to 91.4% at the top of the third.  The Appendix contains examples of how this
calculation would be derived using the sunset rules in effect for two well-known companies.
We construct a similar measure of the value lost under an assumption that an executive
receives a new option award and then resigns, rather than retires, one year later.  As shown on
the next line in Table 5, the value consequences of resignation are generally far more severe than
those for retirement.  The mean and median retirement adjustments to options reduce their value
by 95.1% and 95.9%, respectively, and even at the 10th percentile of the distribution the
adjustment recoups 92.1% of option value for the firm.
To measure the degree to which a firm’s sunset rules discourage employees from
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working elsewhere after they retire, we compare each firm’s treatment of options for executives
who retire with options held by those who die.  Specifically, we calculate the value lost for an
executive who receives a new option award and then dies one year later.  We then compare the
value losses for executives who die and those who retire (using the variable above), and create a
binary (0, 1) variable that equals one if the retirement value loss is equal to or greater than the
death loss.  Firms for which the value equals one would appear to be those most concerned about
the possibility of a retired executive working elsewhere, since this cannot happen when
executives die.  Table 5 shows that 36% of companies have sunset rules that take equal or greater
option value away from retirees compared to decedents.
These seven variables, listed in the top rows of Table 5, serve as our dependent variables
in cross-sectional regressions measuring the strength of firms’ sunset rules.  Our regressions are
estimated for option plans in effect in late 2005, so all financial data is generally measured or
calculated with respect to the year 2004.
We use a number of explanatory variables to identify growth firms in which highly
skilled managers are especially valuable.  Research and development expense divided by net
sales serves as a proxy for the presence of growth opportunities.  When this value is missing
from the Compustat database, we set it equal to zero.  We identify growth firms using the
compound annual growth rate of net sales for each company in the five-year period 1999 to
2004.  To identify industries in which strategic considerations make management retention
important, we use the Herfindahl Index, which measures the degree of competition within an
industry.  We construct the index at the three-digit SIC level using annual data for net sales, and
it equals the sum of the squared market shares of each company in the industry.  The index takes
12 See Section 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code.  Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld,
“Check your noncompete clauses – California court gives employees a new basis to void employment agreements,”
Summer 2001, www.akingump.com/docs/publication/412.pdf.
17
a high value when an industry has strategic interaction among a few large players and the cost of
defections by key employees is potentially high.  To capture the degree of labor mobility in an
industry, we use two variables.  First, we tabulate at the industry level the rate of voluntary
worker turnover (sometimes called the “quit rate”), excluding layoffs, retirements and deaths, as
measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics JOLTS survey between 2001 and 2006.  Second, we
use an index of enforcement of non-competition agreements created by Garmaise (2006) for each
of the 50 U.S. states.  As Garmaise discusses, considerable variation exists in the conditions
under which state courts will enforce non-compete provisions.  In states with low values of his
index, notably California, workers can change jobs within the same industry more easily than
elsewhere in the U.S.12  We expect companies located in states with low values of the Garmaise
index to have stronger sunset rules to counteract their state’s liberal employment laws. 
Additional regression controls include firm size (the log of total assets), firm age (the log of
years since the IPO, with no firm listed as more than 80 years old due to CRSP data limitations),
industry dummy variables defined according to the 48 groupings of Fama and French, and the
breadth of each company’s option program, equal to the percentage of option awards made to
employees other than the top five executive officers, calculated on a cumulative basis over a
company’s entire history on the ExecuComp database, from 2004 to as far back as 1992.
Our regression results appear in Table 6, which presents estimates for firms’ weighted
average vesting schedules as well as the four other dependent variables associated with
retirement sunset rules: the maximum time permitted to exercise options in retirement, an
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indicator variable for the forfeiture of all unvested options at retirement, the percentage of option
value forfeited in each firm by an executive who retires one year after receiving new options,
and an indicator variable for firms whose sunset rules impose equal or greater financial penalties
upon executives when they retire compared to when they die in office.  Along with coefficient
estimates for our main independent variables, we tabulate coefficients for the software industry
dummy variable, both because of the evident importance of human capital as an input in this
industry, and also because the use of options for compensation by software firms has attracted
enormous attention from both academics and business journalists.
In Table 6 statistically significant estimates occur across many of the five regressions.  In
general, sunset rules appear stronger in companies that are smaller, younger, and faster growing,
as shown by estimates in the first three rows of the table.  These findings are broadly consistent
with the retention hypothesis, indicating that knowledge-based firms with high needs to retain
valuable human capital have the strongest retirement sunset rules, since these companies tend to
be young, small, and fast-growing.  The results do not support the horizon hypothesis, which
predicts more lenient sunset rules for firms with more skilled managers.  Further confirmation of
the importance of the retention hypothesis appears in estimates in subsequent rows of Table 6. 
The Herfindahl index is significant in two out of five models, with signs in a direction implying
tighter sunset rules when management retention is important due to strategic interaction with
other firms in an industry.  The Garmaise (2006) non-compete enforcement index has significant
estimates in three out of five models, all again in a direction consistent with tighter sunset rules
when managers are at greater risk of leaving the firm.  The software industry dummy variable
has significant estimates in two out of five models, both with signs implying tighter sunset rules
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when growth opportunities are high.  Neither the R&D / sales nor the industry quit rate variables
generate significant estimates.
Two further patterns in Table 6 appear important to us.  First, our measure of option plan
breadth has little association with the strength of firms’ retirement sunset rules.  This seems to
imply that worker retention concerns, to the extent they influence option plan design, extend well
beyond members of top management down into the ranks of middle and lower management. 
Second, we observe almost no statistically significant estimates in our regression on the left of
Table 6 with options’ vesting periods as the dependent variable; only the historical sales growth
variable has a significant estimate.  Our failure to detect significant associations between firms’
vesting schedules and most of our independent variables is the same outcome reached by Kole
(1997, Table 4), who uses data from 1980 to investigate whether vesting periods are longer for
firms with high values of R&D but does not find significant results.  Our results seem to indicate
that vesting schedules are not as important to firms in designing their option plans as other
parameters such as forfeiture or truncation provisions for executives who leave the company.
We also estimate regressions in which the dependent variables are recomputed to reflect
resignation, instead of retirement, sunset rules.  These regressions’ results generally fail to yield
significant estimates, so we do not tabulate them in order to save space.  This outcome is not
surprising given the lack of variation in the dependent variables documented above, but it poses
some difficulty for our interpretation that sunset rules arise mainly to influence managerial
retention rather than to lengthen managers’ investment horizons.  One might expect retention
concerns to be greatest in the middle of managers’ careers, when any exit from the firm would be
considered a resignation rather than a retirement, while horizon concerns would be greatest at the
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end of a managers’ careers, when exit would be considered retirement.  We find little variation in
sunset rules for resignations, and tighter sunset rules among growth companies with respect to
retirements, an outcome that indicates a concern for retention at the end of managers’ careers,
rather than at the middle.  We conclude that the golden handcuff components of sunset rules
appear to be a significant factor in deterring early retirements of skilled workers, but we do not
find evidence that they are designed to discourage mid-career defections.
IV Sunset rules and executive turnover
Analysis above suggests that options’ sunset rules are set by companies to help them
retain valuable employees.  Numerous studies have documented the costs and benefits of
retaining skilled managers, including the role of executive compensation plans.  Hayes and
Schaefer (1999) show that when CEOs are hired by one firm from another, the hiring firm’s
stock price increases significantly while for former firm’s price falls.  Clayton, Hartzell and
Rosenberg (2005) find that stock volatility increases after episodes of CEO turnover, apparently
due to the market’s uncertainty about the ability of the successor CEO.  Fee and Hadlock (2003)
show that firms hiring CEOs from outside make large equity compensation grants to them, to
offset the compensation they forfeit when leaving their prior firms.  Sundaram and Yermack
(2007) find that defined benefit pension plans are effective in retaining managers until they reach
a target retirement age and in inducing them to retire at that point.  In this section, we attempt to
extend this literature by investigating the connection between sunset rules and actual rates of
executive turnover.
Research into firms’ rates of worker turnover is difficult, because no statistics are
21
publicly reported about worker attrition, and it is not even clear that firms compile this data. 
Prior firm-level research into employee turnover has generally been limited to the five most
highly paid officers of a firm as listed in the compensation section of the annual proxy statement;
when an executive appears in the proxy statement one year and is omitted the next year, the
convention is to assume that the executive has left the company.  We adopt this convention as
well, although we note that it will somewhat over-estimate actual turnover rates, because it is
possible for executives to remain employed but see their position in the firm’s compensation
hierarchy fall so that they are no longer among the five most highly paid.
We use the ExecuComp database to calculate turnover rates for top-five managers in each
company.  We record every individual listed in proxy statements from 2004 back to 1992, or as
long as the company is covered by ExecuComp.  We identify the executive’s last year in the
database as a turnover year (we reserve data from 2005 to determine turnover cases for 2004). 
We divide the number of turnover observations for each company by the total number of person-
years covered by ExecuComp.  As shown in Table 4, mean and median values for this turnover
variable are 12.8% and 12.5%, respectively, substantially lower than the data for industry
turnover rates for workers at all levels of the firm.
Table 7 presents regression analysis of firms’ top management turnover rates as a
function of stock option sunset rules.  Our main explanatory variables, taken from the top rows
of Table 4, are the weighted average time for a firm’s option awards to vest, an indicator for the
forfeiture of unvested options when workers retire, and the maximum time permitted to exercise
options in retirement.  Additional control variables include industry dummy variables, the
cumulative stock return from 1992 to 2004, and the stock’s volatility measured using monthly
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return data over the previous ten years.  We do not include a relative measure of stock
performance, such as the industry average return, since the regressions already include dummy
variables for industries.  When a firm is covered by ExecuComp for a shorter period than the
standard interval of 1992 to 2004, we use a correspondingly shorter period for measuring the
firm’s cumulative stock return.
Estimates in the left column of Table 7 show insignificant association between executive
turnover and variables measuring the sunset rules related to vesting, forfeiture, and truncation. 
Our control variables for stock returns and stock volatility are each strongly significant with the
expected signs.  We proceed to adjust our model to account for the endogeneity of the sunset
rules.  As shown by the analysis in Table 6 above, each firm’s policy for the vesting, forfeiture
and maturity of retirees’ options is not exogenous but instead depends on the firm’s size, age,
industry, and to a certain extent, its need to retain skilled workers.  To take account of this
endogeneity, we re-estimate the turnover regression in Table 7 by replacing the retiree option
maturity variable with its fitted value, using output from the OLS regression in Table 6 that
predicts the option life retained in retirement by executives at each firm.  This instrumental
variable approach should be properly identified since certain independent variables in Table 6 –
especially firm age and firm size – should not have any association with the error terms in Table
7's model of management turnover frequencies.  Our two-stage estimates, shown in the second
column of Table 7, now indicate a positive estimate for the option maturity variable, significant
at the 5 percent level.  Similar estimations using fitted values of the vesting and forfeiture
variables do not lead to significant results.
We conclude that sunset rules for setting option maturities in retirement have important
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effects upon executive turnover.  The point estimate in the right column implies that adding one
year (or 12 months) of maturity to retirees’ options would be associated with a 0.4 percentage
point annual rise in the frequency of management turnover, compared to the unconditional mean
of 12.8%.
A recent paper by Carter and Lynch (2004) uses an alternative measure of employee
turnover based upon the cancellation rates of stock options as disclosed in footnotes to firms’
annual Form 10-K filings.  The authors assume that option cancellations are correlated with
workers’ departure rates from the firm, and they find that cancellations are reduced when a
company reprices its options.  We obtain data on option cancellations for all of the firms in our
sample, and we find mean and median values for the option cancellation rate of 4.8% and 3.7%,
respectively, numbers that are implausibly low as estimates of overall employee turnover.  When
we reestimate the regressions in Table 7 using this quantity as the dependent variable, all of the
important explanatory variables’ coefficients fail to have statistical significance.
V. Conclusions
This paper investigates sunset provisions of executive stock options, showing that when
managers leave their firms, their options become subject to a variety rules related to options’
exercisability and expiration.  These rules vary considerably across companies.  Some firms with
lenient sunset provisions permit exiting managers to retain their options for many years and
provide for continuing or even accelerated vesting of options when managers exit the company. 
In contrast, other firms have less lenient regulations that lead to shortened option lives and
forfeiture of unvested awards.
13 A large number of companies require forfeiture of all options if an executive does not stay with the firm for at
least one year after the award date.  For that reason, in most of our models and calculations we adopt the convention of
assuming that managers leave the company, for whatever reason, one year or more after the award date.
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Along with our documentation of the variety and magnitude of these sunset provisions,
we develop a number of empirical results.  We document the impact of sunset rules upon the
apparent values of new stock options when awarded to managers who expect to retire before the
options expire; our results imply that estimates of option values and total compensation for older
CEOs should be discounted substantially.  We find that the strength of sunset rules varies
company-by-company in relation to each firm’s size, age, skilled labor demand, and the degree
of competitive rivalry within an industry.  In general, sunset rules are stronger when firms should
have a high need to retain valuable human capital.  Consistent with this interpretation, we find a
positive association between the leniency of firms’ sunset provisions and the rate at which top
managers exit the firm.
Appendix: Operation of sunset rules at two companies
In Figures A-I and A-II, we study the effects of sunset rules upon hypothetical option
awards to managers who expect to retire in one year at two well-known S&P 500 companies,
Time Warner and Viacom.  In Figure A-I, the top illustration shows that Time Warner’s option
awards consist of four equal tranches, one of which becomes exercisable on each of the first
through fourth anniversaries of the award date, and all of which expire after ten years.  The
lower illustration shows how these tranches are treated if a manager retires from the company
one year after receiving an option award.13  According to Time Warner’s policies, all tranches
vest immediately at retirement, but their expiration is shortened to five years from the retirement
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date, effectively turning ten-year options into six-year options in our example.  As shown in
Table A1, an executive who expected ex ante to retire from Time Warner one year after his
option award date would perceive the Black-Scholes value of these options as being 16% lower
as a result of the foreseen truncation of their original expiration.
Viacom is a company similar to Time Warner in size and industry, and it also awards ten-
year options that vest ratably over the first four anniversaries after the award date.  However, as
shown in Figure A-II, executives who retire from Viacom obtain far less generous treatment of
their options than those who retire from Time Warner.  If an executive retires one year after
receiving a new option award, Viacom’s option plan requires forfeiture of the three unvested
tranches, representing three-fourths of the entire award, and the remaining tranche has its
expiration truncated from the tenth anniversary of the award date to the fourth.  Together, these
changes, if anticipated ex ante by a manager expecting to retire, would reduce the award date
value of the option by about 83%, as shown in Table A1.
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Table 1
Sample selection
Sample selection for a study of stock option plans in effect for the S&P 500 firms as of Fall
2005.  Stock option plans are available as attachments to firms’ 10-K, 10-Q, Proxy or 8-K SEC
filings.  Some firms provide additional detail about option awards in annual term sheets that are
also filed as attachments to these documents.  Companies are excluded from the study if they do
not have an active stock option plan on file or their plan does not include adequate detail about
the treatment of options when employees leave the company.
Companies in S&P 500
Firms excluded:
   No active plan for awarding stock options
   Newly public, no stock option plan filed with SEC
   Option plan filed, with incomplete data 
Sample for analysis
500
(21)
(3)
(87)
389
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Table 2
Lives of executive stock options
Summary statistics about the lives of executive stock options, based upon an analysis of 389
S&P 500 firms’ option plans in effect during Fall 2005.  Panel A shows the distribution of option
expirations across sample firms as of the award date.  Panel B shows sample statistics about the
option life retained when executives leave their firms due to either retirement, resignation, or
death.  In most companies, age and service criteria are used to differentiate cases of retirement
from resignations.  Data in Panel B represent maximum values, since executives are generally
not permitted to extend the lives of options beyond their original expiration dates.
Panel A: Distribution of executive stock option expirations at award date
Option
expiration
4 years
5 years
6 years
7 years
8 years
9 years
10 years
Mean = 9.57
Std. Dev. = 1.16
Number
of firms
1
7
5
30
7
1
338
Percentage
of sample
0.3%
1.8%
1.3%
7.7%
1.8%
0.3%
86.9%
Panel B: Executive stock option life (maximum, in years)
retained by executives who leave their firms
Reason for leaving firm Mean
Std.
Dev.
Percentiles of distribution
Min 10th 25th Med 75th 90th Max
Retirement
Resignation
Death in office
4.43
0.40
3.15
3.71
1.19
3.17
0
0
0
0.25
0
1
1
0.08
1
3
0.25
1
10
0.25
5
10
5
10
10
10
10
30
Table 3
Vesting policies for executive stock options
Summary statistics about the vesting of executive stock options, based upon an analysis of 389
S&P 500 firms’ option plans in effect during Fall 2005.  Panel A shows the vesting time in years
for at least half of an award to vest, an entire award to vest, and the weighted average time for
the entire award to vest.  Panel B tabulates firms’ policies for the treatment of unvested options
when executives leave their firms due to either retirement, resignation, or death.  In most
companies, age and service criteria are used to differentiate cases of retirement from
resignations.  Pro rata vesting refers to partial vesting of options based upon the fraction of the
full vesting period that an executive has served.
Panel A: Vesting periods (in years) from date of award
Amount of award vested Mean
Std.
Dev.
Percentiles of distribution
Min 10th 25th Med 75th 90th Max
Half of award
Entire award 
Weighted average
2.22
3.59
2.38
0.70
1.07
0.67
0
0
0
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
3
2.5
2
4
2.5
3
5
3
6
10
6
Panel B: Treatment of unvested options for executives who leave their firms
(number of firms, percent of sample)
Retirement Resignation Death in office
Full immediate vesting
Continue original vesting schedule
Pro rata immediate vesting
Other partial vesting
Unvested options forfeited
130
67
12
9
171
33.4%
17.2%
3.1%
2.3%
44.0%
7
7
3
372
1.8%
1.8%
0.8%
95.6%
217
19
8
9
136
55.8%
4.9%
2.1%
2.3%
35.0%
Panel C: Mean option life retained by certain subsamples
of executives who leave their firms
Treatment of unvested options Retirement Resignation Death in office
Full immediate vesting
Forfeited
5.37 years
2.52 years
5.57 years
0.29 years
3.49 years
1.95 years
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Table 4
Impact of sunset provisions upon option compensation of CEOs, by age
Values of stock options and total compensation for CEOs in different age classes, with and
without the impact of companies’ sunset provisions for adjusting option terms when CEOs retire. 
The first two rows of the table show the number of CEOs in each age range who received stock
options in 2004, and the number whose option values would be reduced at their expected
retirement dates according to the rules of company option plans.  Expected retirements are
assumed to occur at age 65 for all CEOs in the first two columns, and one year past the current
age of all CEOs in the right column.  The middle rows of the table show mean values of option
awards for the subsamples of CEOs in each age range, before and after the application of
company policies for treatment of options at retirement.  These policies, described more fully in
Tables II and III, require the forfeiture of some unvested options and truncation of the remaining
life of options that are not forfeited.  All option values are calculated with the Black-Scholes
formula using actual exercise prices and expirations, assumptions for volatility and dividend
yield provided by ExecuComp, and a risk-free rate of 4.5%.  The bottom rows of the table show
mean values of total compensation for CEOs in each age range, both with and without the option
value reductions related to expected retirement dates.  Total compensation is assumed to equal
the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock awards, stock option awards, long-term incentive plan
payouts, and items disclosed as “other annual compensation” such as perquisites and retirement
plan contributions.  The table omits five CEOs who received options with certain performance
conditions which made valuation difficult.
CEO age range 61 - 62 63 - 64 65 and
above
CEOs receiving options
Option values reduced at retirement
Percentage with values reduced
Option values without reductions, mean (000)
Option values with reductions, mean
Percentage change
CEOs in total sample
Total compensation, mean (000)
Total compensation after option value reductions, mean
Percentage change
35
17
49%
$8,688
$7,533
- 13%
40
$13,932
$12,777
- 8%
14
11
79%
$4,708
$2,626
- 44%
18
$10,267
$8,512
-17%
17
14
82%
$8,705
$4,099
- 53%
31
$13,685
$10,279
- 25% 
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics for variables
Descriptive statistics for key variables used in regression analysis of stock option plans maintained by 387 S&P 500 firms in 2005. 
Data on vesting and forfeiture terms for stock options are tabulated from equity compensation plans filed with the SEC by 389
companies.  The variable measuring option value lost at retirement is based upon the costs to a hypothetical executive who is awarded
at-the-money options and retires one year later.  Calculations of these option value losses use the Black-Scholes method and assume a
stock price and exercise price of $25.00, volatility of 0.30, risk-free rate of 0.045, dividend rate of 0.015, and each company’s policies
for vesting, forfeiture and truncation.  Company volatility data is calculated based upon up to ten years of monthly stock returns for
each firm.  The Herfindahl index is based upon firms’ sales data and is tabulated at the three-digit SIC level.  Option plan breadth is
the total fraction of each firm’s options awarded to persons other than the top five executives, based on the company’s entire history
on the ExecuComp database.  The variable measuring years since the IPO date is capped at 80 years, the oldest age available on the CRSP
database.  The industry quit rate is tabulated from Bureau of Labor Statistics survey data.  The non-compete enforcement index is a
count variable between 0 and 12 obtained from Garmaise (2006) based upon the laws of the 50 U.S. states; the index is mapped to
each company according to the geographic location of its headquarters.  The fraction of the firm’s option exercises reported on the
Form 4 database equals the option exercises between 2002 and 2004 reported on the Thomson Financial insider trading database
divided by the firm’s total exercises as reported in footnotes to annual Form 10-K filings.  The mean time at which options are
exercised relative to the expiration date is calculated separately for each firm between 2002 and 2004 based on data reported on the
Thomson database, and the table reports descriptive statistics for these within-firm means.
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Mean
Std.
Dev.
Percentiles
10th 25th Med 75th 90th
Time for option awards to vest (weighted average, months)
Time to exercise options in retirement (maximum, months)
Time to exercise options after resignation (maximum, months)
Forfeiture of all unvested options at retirement (indicator)
Option value lost at retirement (percentage)
Option value lost at resignation (percentage)
Retirement treated same or worse than death (indicator)
Option plan breadth (pct. of awards beyond top five executives)
Annual turnover rate among firm’s top five executives, 1992-2004
Firm size (log of total assets)
Years since firm’s IPO
Research & development expense / net sales
Herfindahl index
Stock return, three years, 2002-04
Sales growth rate, annualized, 1999-2004
Stock volatility
Software industry indicator
Non-compete enforcement index
Industry voluntary quit rate, 2001-05
Fraction of firm’s exercises reported on Form 4 database, 2002-04
Mean time of option exercises, years prior to expiration, 2002-04
Firm awards reload options (indicator)
Firm pays zero dividends in 2004 (indicator)
28.6
52.9
4.8
0.44
53.5%
95.1%
0.36
0.84
12.8%
9.34
34.9
0.038
0.156
0.076
0.087
0.379
0.054
3.848
0.169
0.165
3.68
0.090
0.243
8.1
44.5
14.3
0.50
38.0%
9.8%
0.47
0.11
4.8%
1.39
21.7
0.079
0.160
0.155
0.106
0.158
0.220
2.142
0.066
0.140
2.00
0.287
0.429
24
3
0
0
0
92.1%
0
0.70
6.7%
7.74
10
0
0.027
-0.102
-0.025
0.235
0
0
0.131
0.026
0.93
0
0
24
12
1
0
22.3%
94.5%
0
0.79
9.8%
8.24
17
0
0.056
-0.007
0.022
0.270
0
3
0.138
0.063
2.01
0
0
30
36
3
0
65.7%
95.9%
0
0.87
12.5%
9.19
33
0
0.102
0.084
0.070
0.331
0
4
0.150
0.130
3.62
0
0
30
120
3
1
91.4%
100%
1
0.91
15.8%
10.23
44
0.036
0.191
0.169
0.131
0.438
0
5
0.160
0.229
5.19
0
0
36
120
60
1
96.7%
100%
1
0.95
18.4%
11.21
76
0.145
0.354
0.253
0.230
0.615
0
6
0.239
0.351
6.30
0
1
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Table 6
Cross-sectional determinants of option sunset rules at retirement
Regression estimates for models of various regulations contained in S&P 500 companies’ stock option plans as of
2005.  The dependent variable in the first column equals the weighted average number of months for a company’s
stock option awards to vest.  The second column’s dependent variable equals the maximum number of months
permitted for a retiring employee to exercise vested stock options, multiplied by 10-2 for display purposes.  In the
third column, the binary dependent variable equals one if an executive forfeits unvested options at retirement.  The
dependent variable in the fourth column equals the percentage of option award value lost at retirement by a CEO
who receives new options and retires one year later.  The binary dependent variable in the right column equals one
if the value lost by executives who retire equals or exceeds the value lost by executives who die in office.  Among
the explanatory variables, firm age is capped at 80 years, the oldest age available on the CRSP database.  The
industry quit rate is computed from Bureau of Labor Statistics data.  The non-compete enforcement index is a count
variable between 0 and 12 reported by Garmaise (2006) at the state level.  Option plan breadth is the percentage of
option awards to employees other than the top five executives, measured over all the years in which a firm appears
in the ExeuComp database.  Standard errors appear in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
Dependent variable
Estimation
Vesting
OLS
Retirement
option life
OLS
Retirement
forfeiture
Logit
Retirement
value loss
OLS
Reitrement
>= death
Logit
Firm size (log of total assets)
Firm age (log of years since IPO)
Sales growth (five year CAGR)
R&D / Sales
Herfindahl Index
Option plan breadth
Industry quit rate
Non-compete enforcement index
Software industry 
(indicator)
Observations
Industry indicators (Fama-French)
Adjusted R2
F or Likelihood Ratio statistic
0.55
(0.43)
-0.41
(0.78)
10.49 b
(4.94)
2.28
(9.79)
1.66
(3.74)
4.99
(4.99)
-41.92
(35.25)
0.36
(0.24)
0.43
(6.12)
357
Yes
0.043
1.32 c
0.09 a
(0.02)
0.07 b
(0.04)
-0.56 b
(0.22)
-0.40
(0.45)
-0.15
(0.17)
0.29
(0.23)
0.89
(1.51)
0.03 a
(0.01)
-0.18
(0.22)
387
Yes
0.299
4.30 a
-0.20 b
(0.13)
-0.53 b
(0.21)
1.65
(1.36)
1.71
(3.03)
1.92 b
(0.94)
-1.99
(1.36)
-1.26
(4.22)
-0.12 c
(0.06)
3.45 a
(0.83)
387
Yes
92.98 a
-0.04 b
(0.02)
-0.06 c
(0.03)
0.60 a
(0.21)
0.51
(0.41)
0.23
(0.16)
-0.33
(0.21)
0.14
(1.49)
-0.02 b
(0.01)
0.15
(0.26)
357
Yes
0.217
2.97 a
-0.22
(0.14)
-0.38 c
(0.23)
2.95 b
(1.50)
2.27
(2.89)
2.85 a
(1.00)
-1.81
(1.41)
0.05
(3.90)
-0.09
(0.07)
3.60 a
(0.87)
357
Yes
91.14 a
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels.
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Table 7
Effect of firms’ option sunset rules upon top executive turnover
OLS regression analysis of top executive turnover as a function of companies’ policies for
treatment of stock options at retirement.  Option forfeiture and truncation rules appear in
company equity compensation plan documents filed with the SEC.  The turnover rate for top
executives is based upon changes in the listing of firms’ five highest paid officers in company
proxy statements, as reported by ExecuComp.  The fitted value of the time to exercise options in
retirement is obtained from the regression model presented in the second column of Table 6. 
Standard errors appear below each estimate in parentheses.  Both the turnover rate and stock
return are compounded continuously.  Although these variables are compiled over the period
1992 to 2004 for most companies, a shorter window is used for firms with less data available on
ExecuComp.
Dependent variable: 
Annual turnover rate among top 5 executive group, 1992-04
Cumulative stock return, 1992-2004
Stock volatility
Time for option awards to vest
(weighted average, in months, x 103)
Forfeiture of unvested options at retirement
(indicator)
Time to exercise options in retirement, actual
(maximum, in months, x 103)
Time to exercise options in retirement, predicted
(fitted regression value, x 103)
-0.011 a
(0.002)
0.087 a
(0.019)
-0.357
(0.271)
0.0003
(0.005)
0.056
(0.060)
-0.011 a
(0.002)
0.102 a
(0.020)
-0.381
(0.269)
0.001
(0.005)
0.356 b
(0.140)
Observations
Industry indicator variables
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
357
Yes
0.184
2.71 a
357
Yes
0.198
2.87 a
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels.
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Table A1
Value of adjustments to option terms when managers retire
The table shows the value consequences of adjustments to stock option awards when managers
retire from two companies, using the hypothetical example of a 64-year-old executive who
receives new options when planning to retire one year later at age 65.  Under the option plans of
each company, a new award vests in four annual tranches, and each firm has different rules for
whether the tranches are subject to the possibility of forfeiture and/or reduced time to expiration
when the optionee retires.  The first area of the table shows a “base case” option award that has
no forfeiture and no shortened expiration when the optionee retires.  The second area of the table
shows data for Time Warner, which truncates all option tranches to a maximum of 5 years from
an optionee’s retirement date but requires no forfeiture of unvested options.  The third area of the
table shows data for Viacom, which requires forfeiture of three out of the four award tranches if
the optionee retires, while shortening the reamaining life of the fourth tranche to a maximum of 3
years.  Value calculations, which use the Black-Scholes method, are based on the same set of
input parameters for both companies: award date stock price and exercise price of $25.00,
volatility of 0.30, risk-free rate of 0.45, and dividend rate of 0.015.
Base Case
Tranche 1
Tranche 2
Tranche 3
Tranche 4
Total
Original T
10
10
10
10
Adjusted T
10
10
10
10
Value
$9.93
$9.93
$9.93
   $9.93
$39.72
Time Warner (Figure 1a)
Tranche 1
Tranche 2
Tranche 3
Tranche 4
Total
Value lost relative to Base Case
Original T
10
10
10
10
Adjusted T
6
6
6
6
Value
$8.06
$8.06
$8.06
   $8.06
$32.24
- 16%
Viacom (Figure 1b)
Tranche 1
Tranche 2
Tranche 3
Tranche 4
Total
Value lost relative to Base Case
Original T
10
10
10
10
Adjusted T
4
forfeited
forfeited
forfeited
Value
$6.67
$0
$0
        $0
$6.67
- 83%
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Figure I
Cumulative distributions of option life retained by managers who retire, resign, or die
The figure shows the distribution of executive stock option maturities that managers in different
companies would receive upon exiting their firms while holding unexercised options.  The three
lines tabulate firms’ policies for managers’ retirements, resignations, and deaths, with the
differentiation between retirements and resignations generally depending on age and service
criteria.  In all cases, the value tabulated is the maximum maturity allowed to a manager; if the
original option expiration date precedes the maximum time allowed, the manager simply retains
the original expiration date.  Data is obtained from executive compensation plan documents filed
by 389 S&P 500 firms with the SEC for the year 2005.
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Figure A-I
Adjustments to executive stock options when a manager retires: Time Warner
The figure shows the intervals during which the separate tranches of an executive stock option
award would be exerciseable for managers at Time Warner Inc. who retire one year after
receiving an award.  The top graph shows a typical award with a ten-year time to expiration and
four tranches, which vest sequentially after each of the first four years.  The bottom graph shows
adjustments to the award if the option holder were to retire at the end of the first year.  All of the
tranches would vest immediately, but their expiration dates would be shortened from the tenth to
the sixth year.  The Black-Scholes value lost to the optionee as a result of these changes equals
about 16% of the award date value, as shown in Table A1.
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Figure A-II
Adjustments to executive stock options when a manager retires: Viacom
The figure shows the intervals during which the separate tranches of an executive stock option
award would be exerciseable for managers at Viacom Inc. who retire one year after receiving an
award.   The top graph shows a typical award with a ten-year time to expiration and four
tranches, which vest sequentially after each of the first four years.  The bottom graph shows
adjustments to the award if the option holder were to retire at the end of the first year.  Three of
the four tranches would be forfeited, and the expiration date for the other tranche would be
shortened to the fourth year.  The Black-Scholes value lost to the optionee as a result of these
changes equals about 83% of the award date value, as shown in Table A1.
